Current implementation status
Reviewed on October 31, 2026. The current product is Protocol Guard, with controlled validation of critical operations and a target decentralized authorization network. Initial customer discovery focuses on cross-chain teams; the latest V3 execution evidence covers UUPS upgrades.
Engineering baseline: 70b334dd2bbf2ede5a2c1c825eaa298e7acc2e51, aligned with the October 31 bilingual whitepapers. Test runs and their source revisions are listed in release evidence.
Current evidence
| Capability | Verified scope | Environment |
|---|---|---|
| Independent business approval | Exact-operation signatures, policy binding, role separation and rejection of missing or reused approval | Synthetic approvers; customer identity enrollment remains to be accepted |
| FROST authorization | 22 participants from a 33-share committee produce an authorization certificate | Single-host controlled dealer-generated shares |
| V3 upgrade execution | Two test approvals → 22/33 FROST → real Lit PKP → Gate V3 → delayed ERC1967/UUPS proxy upgrade | BSC testnet, chain 97, October 31 |
| API fallback and recovery | Backup API accepts independently signed approval evidence after primary termination; pause, revocation, RPC failure and committee change are checked | Local integration tests; separate-host failover remains pending |
| Independent review and release | Review/sign CLI, SDK, customer configuration packaging, checksums and deployment receipt verification | Controlled release tooling |
| Cross-chain receive configuration | Fixed LayerZero configuration change with business approvals, local authorization, delay and private-EVM result inspection | Separate hosted demonstration profile |
The October 31 testnet upgrade changed the proxy implementation from V1 to V2, changed the tested value from 7 to 42, and preserved a separate value of 99. Direct upgrades by the deployer were rejected before and after the authorized upgrade. Two RPC endpoints agreed on the final implementation and storage. See release evidence for the transaction.
Frontend, approval and execution boundaries
A canonical hash identifies an operation; it does not prove that a person understood it. The V3 approval path requires signatures over the exact proposal and a fixed customer policy. Approvers use an independent review client and a trusted source for the expected operation. API, signing nodes and the customer Lit Action check the same policy binding.
The Gate enforces its execution and recovery constraints on-chain. The API observes pause, service exit, revocation and network configuration at a common canonical block before FROST authorization, Lit authorization or execution preparation. The console refreshes this state every 10 seconds and marks it unavailable on RPC failure. RPC failure stops further authorization. A new committee configuration requires reviewed local configuration updates.
The controlled fallback test uses separate API processes on one machine. Independent hosts, organizations, devices and identity administration are deployment properties, not a consequence of process count.
Recovery and compatibility
Gate V3 includes separate customer and recovery governance groups, delayed recovery and explicit pause/exit controls. Local tests exercise these paths. The October 31 public-testnet run did not complete a 24-hour recovery drill. The current V3 governance membership is fixed at construction; member rotation is not implemented.
The V3 release workflow targets UUPS upgrades. A customer's Safe modules and Guards, Timelock roles, AccessControl administrators, ProxyAdmin and emergency paths need individual integration and bypass review. The hosted receive-configuration workflow, older immutable-PKP Gate and V3 upgrade path are separate profiles.
Remaining deployment work
- Deploy signers, coordinators, approval clients and evidence services across independently administered hosts; exercise DKG, network partitions, restart and failover.
- Enroll real customer approval identities and governance groups, validate the policy, and inspect all alternate execution paths.
- Verify Lit management authority and all PKP signing permissions, including changes, revocation and monitoring.
- Complete production key protection, external alert delivery, recovery drills and independent security review.
- Obtain customer acceptance for a defined operation before production authority migration.
Luvion can offer a controlled workflow evaluation and testnet integration now. No production customer deployment or completed external audit is recorded by this evidence.
Research track and historical records
Threshold ML-DSA remains a synthetic-key research track. Threshold ECDSA/secp256k1 is not an implemented signing backend. Historical August and September validation, including the old 1-of-1 sandbox Gate path, remains in release evidence; it is not the threshold profile of the October 31 V3 run.